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Abstract. We calculate the key sharing rate of Lu et al.’s Quantum Key Recy-
cling (QKR) protocol. The key sharing rate is another version of the key rate, 
but it can be calculated for both the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) proto-
cols and the QKR protocols. We define the key sharing rate in this study and 
compare the key sharing rate of the QKR protocol to the rate of the QKD proto-
cols. We found Lu et al.’s QKR protocol can be used to share keys more effi-
ciently than BB84 in some situations. We also compare the six-state version of 
Lu et al.’s QKR protocol to the six-state QKD protocol. The results of this 
study show the potential advantages of using pre-shared keys to replace the 
public discussion in quantum protocols.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
An important application of quantum cryptography is key distribution. A class of 
quantum protocol called Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is designed to do this. The 
goal of QKD is to let all participants share secret keys. In 1984, the first QKD proto-
col BB84 [1] was proposed. After this, many studies proposed different QKD proto-
cols [2-6]. An important research direction of QKD is to increase its efficiency with a 
noise channel. In BB84, the sender, Alice, randomly sends qubits in two bases (four 
state) {|0⟩, |1⟩, |+⟩ = 1
√2
(|0⟩ + |1⟩), |−⟩ = 1
√2
(|0⟩ − |1⟩)}  to the receiver, Bob. Bob 
will randomly choose a basis to measure the qubits. Then Alice and Bob will use a 
classical authentication channel to do the public discussion. If Alice and Bob choose 
the same basis to prepare/measure a qubit, the measurement result of this qubit will be 
their shared raw key. Otherwise, the measurement result will be discarded. When the 
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quantum channel has noise, the qubits may be disturbed by noise and cause some 
error in the raw key. The error can also be caused by the eavesdropper, Eve, who 
wants to eavesdrop the communication. So Alice and Bob will do error correction and 
then privacy amplification to extract the secret key from the raw key. The ratio of the 
extracted secret key and the raw key is called key rate. The key rate is according to 
the error rate of the quantum channel. the key rate is an important efficiency index of 
a QKD protocol. 
On the other hand, a class of quantum protocol called Quantum Key Recycling 
(QKR) is first proposed in 1982 [7]. The QKR protocol is designed to transmit a se-
cret message. In the QKR protocol, the key used to encrypt the message can be recy-
cled. Since the random number (which can be a key) is also a kind of message, we can 
use the QKR protocol to do the key distribution like the QKD protocol. The number 
of studies of the QKR protocol is fewer than the studies of the QKD protocol, and 
there is no QKR protocol that can run in the noise quantum channel1. Until 2020, Lu 
et al. propose a QKR protocol [12], which can run in the noise quantum channel and 
recycle the used key according to the error rate of the quantum channel.  
In Lu et al.’s QKR protocol, Alice and Bob pre-shared three keys: 𝑢𝑢, 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏, 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣. Alice 
encodes the cipher 𝐶𝐶 = 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣⨁𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑(𝑚𝑚||𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶), where 𝑚𝑚 is the message, 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶 is the 
Message Authentication Code of 𝑚𝑚 and 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑() is an error correction code encoding 
function, into two bases single qubits according to the key 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏 and sends the qubits to 
Bob. Bob measures the received qubits according to the key 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏, decoding the error 
correction code and then check the 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶. Alice and Bob then will recycle 𝑢𝑢, 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏 and 
partial recycle 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 according to the error rate of the quantum channel. The ratio of the 
recycled key and the used pre-shared key is called key recycling rate.  
Because Lu et al.’s QKR protocol can be used to do the key distribution (key shar-
ing) with a noisy quantum channel, we can compare the efficiency of QKD protocols 
with the efficiency of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol.  
1.2 Conclusion 
In this study, we give a new definition of the efficiency of the QKD/QKR protocols 
called key sharing rate. And we compare the key sharing rate of Lu et al.’s QKR pro-
tocol with the key sharing rate of BB84. We find out that Lu et al.’s QKR protocol 
has a higher key sharing rate than BB84 when the error rate of the quantum channel is 
fixed and less than 0.11. We also modify Lu et al.’s QKR protocol to the six-state 
version of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol, which using three bases (sit-state) quantum state 
to encode the cipher and compare it with six-state QKD protocol [2, 3]. We find out 
that the QKR protocol gets more benefit from the six-state encoding than the QKD 
protocol. These results show that using the QKR protocol to share keys is a viable 
option. 
 
                                                        
1 There are some studies proposed QKR protocols [8-11] which can run in the noise quantum 
channel. But they all have a common security loophole.   
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2 Preliminaries 
2.1 Error Correction Code 
The Error Correction Code (ECC) can be used to detect and correct errors of the mes-
sage. ECC uses redundant information to correct errors. In this study, we use binary 
linear codes to be the ECC. We define an encoding function 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑(𝑀𝑀) = 𝐶𝐶 . This 
function can encode a message 𝑀𝑀 into a binary linear code 𝐶𝐶 with minimum Ham-
ming distance 𝑑𝑑. We also define a decoding function which can decode the message 
𝑀𝑀 from 𝐶𝐶, and detect and correct the potential errors. A binary linear code 𝐶𝐶 with 
minimum Hamming distance 𝑑𝑑 can correct at most  ⌊𝑑𝑑−1
2
⌋ errors. We also assume 𝐶𝐶 =
𝑀𝑀||𝑠𝑠, where 𝑠𝑠 is the redundant information added by  𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑() called syndrome.   
 If we want to correct more errors, we need to encode the message 𝑀𝑀 into a code 𝐶𝐶 
with bigger 𝑑𝑑. The bigger the Hamming distance 𝑑𝑑, the longer the length of the code 
𝐶𝐶. We can use information theory to calculate how many redundant information we 
need. When the error rate is 𝑄𝑄, the redundant information needed to correct these 
errors is at least 𝐻𝐻(𝑄𝑄), where 𝐻𝐻() is the Shannon entropy in bits. The length of the 
redundant information in bits is also 𝐻𝐻(𝑄𝑄) bits. 
2.2 Key rate 
In the QKD protocols, all participants will share m-bits raw key (a binary random 
number which may have errors and be partially knew by Eve) after the quantum part. 
The participants will do error correction and privacy amplification to extract a shorter 
but secure secret key, which is n-bits long. The key rate of the QKD protocols can be 
defined as 𝑛𝑛
𝑚𝑚
.  
The meaning of the key rate is how many percents of the raw key can be used to be 
a secret key. The key rate is dependent on the error rate of the quantum channel in this 
round of the QKD protocol. The errors may come from the environment noise of the 
quantum channel or Eve’s attack, and the participant can use public discussion to get 
the error rate. Since every error may come from Eve’s attack, we need to consider all 
errors is caused by Eve to cover the worst case. So the meaning of the key rate is also 
how much information about the raw key is known by Eve.  
The key rate is a useful efficiency index of the QKD protocol. At a certain error 
rate, a QKD protocol which has higher key rate can share more secret key and is more 
efficient. The error rate where the key rate goes to zero is also important. It shows the 
maximum error rate of the quantum channel that the QKD protocol can still share 
secret keys, for example, BB84 can share keys if the error rate is not beyond 0.11 and 
sit-state protocol can share keys if the error rate is not beyond 0.126. 
2.3 Key Recycling Rate 
The key recycling rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol is defined as below: Alice and Bob 
use 𝑚𝑚-bits pre-shared key to run the QKR protocol. After the protocol, they will use 
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privacy amplification to shoring the used key to ensure the security of the key. The 
shorted key is 𝑛𝑛-bits, and the key recycling rate is 𝑛𝑛
𝑚𝑚
. 
The key recycling rate looks like the key rate. They both use privacy amplification 
to ensure the security of the key. But the key rate is for the new shared key, and the 
recycling rate is for the used pre-shared key. Because of this difference, they cannot 
be compared directly.  
3 Compare BB84 with Lu et al.’s QKR protocol [12] 
Since QKR protocols are different from QKD protocols and can’t calculate the “key 
rate” of a QKR protocol with the original definition of the key rate, we need a new 
definition of key rate to let us compare QKR protocols and QKD protocols.  
Definition 1. After the participants finish the quantum part of the QKR/QKD proto-
col, they will share an 𝑚𝑚-bits raw key. The participant will do the error correction 
and privacy amplification to extract a 𝑛𝑛-bits secret key, which is secure and synchro-
nous between all participants. And these processings may consume 𝑘𝑘-bits pre-shared 
key. The key sharing rate is defined as 𝑛𝑛−𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚
.  
 For QKD protocols, the key sharing rate is just equal to the key rate. Since the 
QKD protocol doesn’t need any pre-shared keys, it will consume no keys. The key 
sharing rate of a QKD protocol can be denoted by:  𝑛𝑛
𝑚𝑚
, which is the definition of the 
key rate of the QKD protocol. 
 For QKR protocols, they don’t need to do privacy amplification to shorting the raw 
key, but they need to consume some keys to share the raw key. The key sharing rate of 
a QKR protocol is equal to 
𝑚𝑚−𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚
= 1 − 𝑘𝑘
𝑚𝑚
. 
We then can compare the key sharing rate of BB84 with the key sharing rate of Lu 
et al.’s QKR protocol. The key sharing rate of BB84 just equals the key rate of BB84, 
and it is calculated by many studies [13, 14]. So we just need to calculate the key 
sharing rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol.  
To calculate the key sharing rate of a QKR protocol, we need to know how many 
pre-shared key 𝑘𝑘 is consumed when Alice and Bob share 𝑚𝑚-bits raw key at quantum 
bit error rate (QBER) 𝑄𝑄. In Lu et al.’s study, they already calculate the key recycling 
rate of their protocol2 (as shown in Fig. 1). But the length of the consumed pre-shared 
key is according to not only the key recycling rate but also the length of used keys. In 
Lu et al.’s QKR protocol, a message 𝑀𝑀 contains the message (𝑚𝑚-bits random num-
ber), 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶, and ECC. When the message is long enough, we can ignore the length of 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶. The length of ECC is according to the predicted noise level of the quantum 
                                                        
2 In Lu et al.’s QKR protocol, there are three keys 𝑢𝑢, 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏, 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 will be consumed. But when the 
message is long enough, the loss of the keys 𝑢𝑢, 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏 is less and can be ignored. In this study, 
we set the key recycling rate of 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 as the key recycling rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol. 
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channel 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 . Because the ECC should correct itself, the length of the ECC is 
𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�
1−𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�
∗ 𝑚𝑚.  Combine the above. We can get the length of  𝑀𝑀, and thus the 
length of the used key is (1 + 𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�
1−𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�
) ∗ 𝑚𝑚. The length of the consumed key is 
then  
 �1 + 𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�
1−𝐻𝐻�𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝�
� ∗ 𝑚𝑚 ∗ (1 − 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝑟𝑟 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘). (1) 
 
Fig. 1. The x-axis denotes the real QBER, and the y-axis denotes the key recycling rate of Lu et 
al.’s QKR protocol. 
Now we are ready to calculate the key sharing rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol. 
Unlike the QKD protocol that estimates the QBER after the quantum part of the pro-
tocol by the public discussion, Lu et al.’s QKR protocol needs to predict the QBER 
before the quantum part of the protocol and decides how many error-tolerable we 
need. We can see Eq. (1) has two variable: 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 and 𝑄𝑄 (in the formula of key re-
cycling rate). If the prediction QBER 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 is less than the real one 𝑄𝑄, Lu et al.’s 
QKR protocol will fail, and the key recycling rate is 0. On the other hand, if 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 
is more than 𝑄𝑄, we have to waste some keys to protect the useless part of the syn-
drome and thus decrease the key sharing rate. When the prediction is perfect, we can 
get the best key sharing rate at that QBER. The result of the calculation of the key 
sharing rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol shows in Fig 2.  
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Fig. 2. The x-axis denotes the real QBER 𝑄𝑄, and the y-axis denotes the key sharing rate. The 
line of error-tolerable 0.07 shows the key sharing rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol with the 
prediction QBER 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 0.07 according to 𝑄𝑄. When 𝑄𝑄 = 0.07, this is the best key sharing 
rate out of all 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 for Lu et al.’s QKR protocol. The line of optimal shows the best key 
sharing rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol we can achieve according to 𝑄𝑄 (i.e., the key sharing 
rate when 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝑄𝑄). And the line BB84 shows the key sharing rate (key rate) of the BB84 
protocol according to the real 𝑄𝑄. 
In Lu et al.’s QKR protocol, the key 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 used to protect the syndrome can partially 
recycle and thus is more efficient than the BB84 protocol, which leaks all information 
contained in the syndrome. But the length of the syndrome used in Lu et al.’s QKR 
protocol is longer than the syndrome used in the BB84 protocol because the BB84 
protocol uses a classical authentication channel to send the syndrome and thus the 
syndrome doesn’t need to correct itself. We can see when the QBER is low, the effect 
of the longer syndrome is not obvious, and Lu et al.’s QKR protocol has a higher key 
sharing rate. The high key sharing rate in Lu et al.’s QKR protocol is achieved at the 
cost of low error-tolerable and high cost of the keys derived from situations where the 
real QBER is higher than the prediction. It worth mentioning that when the prediction 
QBER is 0.11, the key sharing rate of our QKR protocol is just equal to the key shar-
ing rate of BB84 and thus has no benefit. This shows that Lu et al.’s QKR protocol is 
a viable option. When the noise of the quantum channel is fixed and lower than 0.11, 
using Lu et al.’s QKR protocol to share keys is more efficient.  
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4 Variance 
In this section, we modify Lu et al.’s QKR protocol to try to increase its key sharing 
rate. Unlike the original version of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol encoding the message 
into two bases quantum state, we encode the message into three bases (six-state) {|0⟩, |1⟩, |+⟩, |−⟩, |+𝑘𝑘⟩ = 1
√2
(|0⟩ + 𝑟𝑟|1⟩), |−𝑘𝑘⟩ = 1
√2
(|0⟩ − 𝑟𝑟|1⟩)}  in our modified 
QKR protocol, which we call six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol. This mod-
ified causes two effects of the key using in Lu et al.’s QKR protocol. First, we need 
more 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏 to decide the basis of every qubit. Second, the key recycling rate of 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 is 
affected. The first difference does not influence the key recycling rate of 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏 in Lu et 
al.’s QKR protocol because the leakage of 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏 is only according to Bob’s response. 
The effect of the second difference is shown in Fig. 3. The key recycling rate of 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 is 
increased when the QBER does not achieve 0.5.  
 
Fig. 3. The key recycling rate of 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 in the six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol. Be-
cause the key recycling rate of 𝑢𝑢 and 𝐾𝐾𝑏𝑏 is almost 1, the key recycling rate of 𝐾𝐾𝑣𝑣 can also be 
seen as the total key recycling rate of the six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR. 
Because of the higher key recycling rate, the six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR has 
a higher key sharing rate. We compare the sit-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR proto-
col with the six-state QKD protocol [2, 3]. The six-state QKD protocol is a modified 
version of BB84, which also using three bases (sit-state) qubits and has a higher key 
sharing rate (key rate) than BB84.  
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Fig. 4.  The x-axis denotes the real QBER 𝑄𝑄 and the y-axis denotes the key sharing rate. The 
line of error-tolerable 0.07 shows the key sharing rate of the six-state version of Lu et al.’s 
QKR protocol with the prediction QBER 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 0.07 according to 𝑄𝑄. When 𝑄𝑄 = 0.07, this 
is the best key sharing rate out of all 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 for six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol. 
The line of optimal shows the best key sharing rate of the six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR 
protocol we can achieve according to 𝑄𝑄 (i.e., the key sharing rate when 𝑄𝑄𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝑄𝑄). And the 
line six-state QKD shows the key sharing rate (key rate) of the six-state QKD protocol accord-
ing to the real 𝑄𝑄. 
The comparing results of the key sharing rate of the six-state version of Lu et al.’s 
QKR protocol and the key sharing rate of six-state QKD protocol is very like the 
comparing results of the key sharing rate of the original version of Lu et al.’s QKR 
protocol and the key sharing rate of BB84. But if we calculate the difference of the 
key sharing rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol and the QKD protocol. We can find that 
the six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol gets more benefit of the key sharing 
rate from the six-state encoding than the six-state QKD protocol (as shown in Fig. 5).   
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Fig. 5. The difference of the key sharing rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol and the QKD proto-
col. The line of four-state shows the difference in the key sharing rate of the original version of 
Lu et al.’s QKR protocol and BB84, according to the QBER 𝑄𝑄. The line of six-state shows the 
difference of the key sharing rate of the six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol and six-
state QKD protocol according to the QBER 𝑄𝑄. 
5 Conclusion and open questions 
In this paper, we define the key sharing rate to compare the efficiency of key sharing 
of the QKD protocols and the QKR protocols. We calculate and compare the key 
sharing rate of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol, six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR protocol, 
BB84, and the six-state protocol. We find out that when the noise level of the quan-
tum channel is fixed and low, using Lu et al.’s QKR protocol to share key is more 
efficient than regular QKD protocols. This result shows the QKR protocol, which 
uses pre-shared keys to replace the public discussion, may get more advantage from 
the properties of quantum. And the benefit of the QKR protocol is not only to simpli-
fy the communication of the protocols [8, 15].  
 There is an open question of how to design a QKR protocol with a higher key shar-
ing rate. In this study, we found out that the six-state version of Lu et al.’s QKR pro-
tocol has a higher key sharing rate than the original version. We think the way used to 
increase the key rate of the QKD protocol may also be used in the QKR protocol. This 
will be the research direction of our future work.    
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